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NEW FORMALITIES FOR CASUAL LABOR:
ADDRESSING UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
CHINA’S LABOR CONTRACT LAW
Daniel S. S. Cairns †
Abstract: China’s Labor Contract Law (“LCL”) came into force on January 1,
2008. The first major piece of labor legislation since the 1994 Labor Law, the Labor
Contract Law expanded legal protection for workers by mandating that labor contracts be
in writing and delivered to all workers. Employers, predicting that the law would
effectively raise the cost of employing full-time, long-term workers, sought methods of
“creative compliance” with the law. One avenue for creative compliance emerged
through the loophole in the LCL for so-called “dispatch workers.” Dispatch workers are
formally employed by third-party dispatch service agencies and thus not covered by
employment contracts with the firms where they perform their job (“accepting entities”).
In the first five years following the LCL’s enactment, dispatch workers grew from a
negligible share of China’s labor force into a pervasive phenomenon. The dispatch
worker exception began to swallow the rule, eroding the intended labor protections of the
LCL. In response, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress amended
the LCL, effective July 1, 2013. These amendments drastically reduced the permissible
scale and purpose of dispatch labor and augured tighter regulation for the dispatch
industry. Following a period of public comment, the Ministry of Human Resources and
Social Services provided specific departmental rules regarding the licensing of dispatch
agencies and standard industry-wide practices, effective March 1, 2014. The new
regulations restricted enterprises from hiring more than ten percent of their workers as
dispatch workers and clarified the obligations of dispatching agencies as employers.
With reports of abuse of dispatch workers continuing to surface, the effects of the
amendments and the provisions on labor remain unclear.
This comment addresses China’s effort to intervene in employment arrangements
via legislation. It first surveys the background of labor legislation in China from the Mao
era, through reform, and into the twenty-first century. It then examines the interaction of
the labor market and labor legislation, as employers respond to changes in China’s labor
regime through the introduction of Amendments to the LCL. Finally, this comment
suggests that reform in labor legislation based on individual contract should be secondary
to expanding collective labor rights.

† 2015 J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law. The author received a B.A.
in Asian Studies and Chinese from the University of Puget Sound and a M.A. in Social Science from the
University of Chicago. The author would like to thank Prof. Kate O’Neill at the University of Washington
School of Law for her sage advice during the writing of this Comment. He also gratefully acknowledges
the support and guidance of Ellen David Friedman, Suofu Rao, Tong Li, Tracy Wu, Prof. Matthew Hale,
and the editorial staff of the Washington International Law Journal.
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INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 2010, the National Bureau of Statistics of China
credited the country’s “scientific approach to . . . economic and social
development” when it boasted 8.7% real growth of GDP per capita
following the Great Recession.1 Despite the global economic downturn at
the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Chinese economic
prospects shined brightly in 2009. Foreign commentators were quick to
attribute this growth to the strength of the Chinese workforce, perhaps
exemplified by Time Magazine’s nomination of “The Chinese Worker” as
“Person of the Year” in 2009.2 Indeed, China’s “scientific approach”3 from
the early 2000s4 and throughout the recession depended on “The Chinese
Worker” as a cheap source of labor to maintain a competitive advantage in a
global market.5 However, by 2010, as Chinese workers asserted demands on
an unprecedented scale,6 the previous decade’s development model premised
on a strong labor market weakened.7
In what was perhaps a response to the shift in China’s economy, labor
tensions mounted the late 2000s and early 2010s.8 A massive wave of
strikes crested in 2010. Since then, worker insurgency has become a
common feature of labor politics in China, despite the government’s efforts
to appease workers through legislation. 9 Disputes about dispatch labor

1

NAT’L BUREAU OF STAT. OF CHINA, STAT. COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
2009 NAT’L ECON. & SOC. DEV. (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/NewsEvents/201
002/t20100226_26295.html.
2
See e.g., Austin
Ramzy,
The Chinese Worker,
TIME (Dec.
16,
2009),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1946375_1947252_1947256,00.html.
3
Otherwise known as the “Kexue fazhan guan” (
). [Scientific Outlook on Development].
4
See Cheap Labour Fueling Growth, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 7, 2002), http://www.china.org.cn/english/
48127.htm.
5
THE GLOBAL RECESSION AND CHINA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY 6 (Dali Yang ed., Palgrave Macmillan
2012). See generally Dali L. Yang, Economic Transformation and its Political Discontents in China:
Authoritarianism, Unequal Growth, and the Dilemmas of Political Development, 9 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI.
143, 151 (2006) (“For more than a decade before 2004, wages for migrant workers toiling in factories in
the Pearl River Delta hardly increased”).
6
See Jonathan Watts, Strikes in China Signal End to Era of Low-Cost Labour and Cheap Exports,
THE GUARDIAN (June 17, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/17/china-strikes-economy.
7
See generally Guoguang Wu, China in 2010, 50 ASIAN SURV. 18, 18-24 (2011).
8
See infra Part II.
9
See generally ELI FRIEDMAN, INSURGENCY TRAP: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTSOCIALIST CHINA (2014).
ON THE

JANUARY 2015

NEW FORMALITIES FOR CASUAL LABOR

221

arrangements and violations have become a common subset of the larger
wave of insurgency.10
The Chinese state, growing increasingly concerned about the
economic effects of mass labor insurgency, strengthened legal protections
for workers while simultaneously appealing to employers’ interests. In
China, as elsewhere, 11 labor law reforms granting legal protections to
workers aimed to mediate industrial conflict.12 China’s signal effort to
provide safeguards for workers in the late 2000s was the Labor Contract
Law (“LCL”).13 Designed to increase protection for workers’ rights,14 it
mandated labor contracts be in writing and delivered to all workers.15 Under
Article 14 of the LCL, the worker and employer are required to enter into an
“open-term contract”16 after either two fixed-term contracts or ten years
together, whichever comes first.17 These open-term contracts limit at-will
employment, preventing termination of employment absent a statutorilyspecified cause, and as such have been opposed by employers seeking labor
flexibility.18 To gain political purchase from these employers, the LCL
excluded employees fitting the definition of “dispatch worker” (sometimes

10

See Investigation on the Dispatch of Labor Systems, CHINESE LABOR NEWS TRANSLATIONS (June
30, 2011), http://www.clntranslations.org/file_download/141 (citing as example how Huangpu district court
in Shanghai handled seventy-eight cases of dispatch labor-related disputes in 2010).
11
See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935) (“Experience has proved that
protection by law of the right of employees . . . safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees”); David Walsh, To Combat the Strike Crisis, Walsh
Urges the Wagner Bill; The Massachusetts Senator Says the Measure, While Defining Unfair Practices,
Would
Leave
Employers
and
Employees
Free,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June 3, 1934), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A01E4D91239E33ABC4B53DFB066838
F629EDE.
12
See Virginia Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, The Recursivity of Reform: China's Amended Labor
Contract Law, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 973, 987 (2014) (“[T]here are many resemblances between the
cycles of reform experienced in the West and the ongoing reform of Chinese labor and employment law”).
13
See generally Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa ((
) [Labor
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), translated in RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA (2010) [hereinafter LCL].
14
See id. at Art. 1.
15
Id. at Art. 10.
16
Id. at Art. 14 (“An open-ended labor contract is one where the employing unit and the worker have
agreed not to stipulate a definite ending date”).
17
Id.
18
See Jovita Wang, Article 14 of China’s New Labor Contract Law: Using Open-Term Contracts to
Appropriately Balance Worker Protection and Employer Flexibility, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 433, 441
(2009).
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“agency worker”) from the open-term contract presumption. 19 Labor
contracts exempted other parts of the casual workforce, including part-time
employees.
Even with the exception for part-time and dispatch workers, labor
contract securities provided by the LCL conflict with so-called “flexible”
employment trends and have proven unpopular with employers. 20
Anticipating the LCL coming into effect, many large enterprises avoided
forming open-term employment contracts by preemptively laying off staff
members and re-hiring them under new contracts.21 The LCL also increased
demand for dispatch workers, a section of the labor force less regulated by
the labor laws, and hence less financially demanding. 22 As employers
circumvented the LCL in the five years following its enactment, dispatch
workers grew from a very small percentage into almost one-fifth of the labor
force. 23 Whether the amendments and implementing regulations placed
upon worker dispatch services are sufficient to placate labor unrest and
appease employers demanding labor flexibility is a question that remains
unanswered.
This comment addresses China’s effort to intervene in employment
arrangements via legislation. Part II discusses the balancing act of labor
protections and economic development. Part III introduces the Chinese
strategy of promoting labor rights through individualized labor contracts.
Part IV then examines the recent history of labor contract legislation in
China, the effect of these laws, and the scope of the new amendments and
implementing regulations. In Part V this comment suggests that the dispatch
industry and flexible employment are incompatible with providing basic
rights to workers like equal pay and workplace safety. This comment is
skeptical of legislative fixes for dispatch agencies premised on individual
contract rights. Ultimately, this comment contends that in order to protect
China’s workers as intended under the LCL, the country would need to
recognize collective rights at work.

19

See LCL, supra note 13, at ch. 5, sec. 2.
Dan Harris, China's New Labor Law as Plague on All Employer's Houses, CHINA L. BLOG (May 5,
2008), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2008/05/chinas_new_labor_law_as_plague.html.
21
See infra Part III.
22
See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 980-81.
23
Dexter Roberts, Why China’s Factories Are Turning to Temp Workers, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK.
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-08/why-chinas-factories-are-turning-totemp-workers; see generally The Dispatch Labor System in China Questioned, CHINA LABOR NEWS
TRANSLATIONS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.clntranslations.org/article/64/dispatch-labor-questioned.
20
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CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REGIME BALANCES DEVELOPMENTAL
OBJECTIVES AND SOCIALIST LABOR PROTECTIONS

China’s policies toward industrial relations balance two contradictory
principles. On the one hand there is the capitalist principle: China seeks to
market affordable labor to employers to expand both foreign direct
investment24 and exports.25 In this regard, China has seen fantastic results,
especially vis-à-vis its main global economic partner, the United States.26
On the other hand, China retains a socialist principle. The country maintains
a nominally socialist political-economic order, led by the working class.27
China’s recent record on delivering the promised “workers’ state” is most
visible in efforts to alleviate social tensions.28
Historically, these two principles have waxed and waned with respect
to one another. During the Mao era, the socialist principle dominated.29 In
1956, China virtually abolished labor contracts and brought all workers and
enterprises under government control. 30 China guaranteed work and
livelihood to all able workers through a system of welfare known as the
“iron rice bowl.”31 Within this context, a system of residency registration
(hukou) 32 established a limiting factor on public benefits.33 Hukou residence
24
See Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, 2014 Chinese and Foreign Investment Promotion
Agencies Conference Held in Beijing (Jan. 26, 2014), available at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201402/20140200485647.shtml
(“Mr.
Wang Shouwen, Assistant Minister of Commerce of PRC said in his address that international investment
is an important impetus to push the economic recovery. Chinese government will continue attaching great
importance to the international investment and cooperation, further optimizing investment environment and
improving the level of introducing FDI and going global”); see generally Elissa Braunstein & Gerald
Epstein, Bargaining Power and Foreign Direct Investment in China: Can 1.3 Billion Consumers Tame the
Multinationals? (Univ. Mass. Amherst Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 45, 2002).
25
Mary Amiti & Caroline Freund, The Anatomy of China's Export Growth, in CHINA’S GROWING
ROLE IN WORLD TRADE 35, 36 (Robert C. Feenstra & Shang-Jin Wei eds., 2010) (“[China] is continuing to
specialize in labor-intensive goods”).
26
See, e.g., David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor
Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2122 (2013) (“In
2000, the low-income-country share of US imports reached 15 percent and climbed to 28 percent by 2007,
with China accounting for 89 percent of this growth”).
27
XIANFA Art. 1 (2004) (China).
28
See LIN CHUN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE SOCIALISM 129 (2006); see generally CHING
KWAN LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR PROTESTS IN CHINA’S RUSTBELT AND SUNBELT (2007).
29
See generally MAURICE MEISNER, MAO’S CHINA AND AFTER (1999).
30
KE CHEN, LABOUR LAW IN CHINA 31 (2011).
31
SAROSH KURUVILLA, CHING KWAN LEE & MARY GALLAGHER, FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO
INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN A CHANGING CHINA 3-4 (2011).
32
Kam Wing Chan, The Chinese Hukou System at 50, 50 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 197, 199203 (2009).
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permits provided a right to social insurance, publicly subsidized healthcare,
and education to residents of a locale where they are registered.34 These
rights were not automatically transferrable when a worker migrated in search
of work, even domestically.35
Later, under the contract system re-established by Chinese politician
Deng Xiaoping,36 hukou remained, while demand for labor depended on
mobile capital.37 The spatial separation of work from socialist security
under the hukou system effectuated a rapid and efficient extraction of labor
power from Chinese workers.38 The resulting combination of policies put
workers in a precarious position as unprotected migrants within their own
country. The capitalist principle resurged.
Even in its present capitalist mode, the responsibility for safeguarding
workers’ interests theoretically remains vested in the Chinese Communist
Party.39 The Communist Party delegates authority among the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”), the Ministry of Human Resources
and Social Security (“MOHRSS”), and localities tasked with implementing
labor laws.40
As a state-controlled body monopolizing economic collective
bargaining for employees,41 the ACFTU is a unique institution. Defined by
the Trade Union Law, the mission of the ACFTU is twofold. First, the
ACFTU “represent[s] the interests of the workers and staff members and

33
Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes
and Changes, 160 CHINA Q. 818, 819 (1999); see Jessica L. Montgomery, The Inheritance of Inequality:
Hukou and Related Barriers to Compulsory Education for China's Migrant Children, 21 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 591 (2012).
34
Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, supra note 33, at 821.
35
Montgomery, supra note 33, at 598-99.
36
See MEISNER, supra note 29, at 452 (discussing Deng Xiaoping, a Chinese politician who “saw the
mechanism of the market as a means to eventual socialist ends, as the most efficient way to break down the
stifling system of centralized state planning to speed up the development of modern productive forces,
thereby creating the essential material foundations for a future socialist society”).
37
Kam Wing Chan, The Household Registration System and Migrant Labor in China: Notes on a
Debate, 36 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 357, 359 (2010).
38
Ngai Pun & Jenny Chan, The Spatial Politics of Labor in China: Life, Labor, and a New
Generation of Migrant Workers, 112 S. ATLANTIC Q. 179, 181 (2013) (“[T]he distinctively noncapitalist
hukou system serves the interests of capital even better than the company towns or urban tenements in
which Western proletarian workers were housed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”) (internal
citations omitted).
39
XIANFA
General
Program
(2012)
(China),
available
at
http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm.
40
See RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA 5 (2009).
41
INT’L CONFED. OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, ANN. SURV. OF VIOLATIONS OF TRADE UNION RTS. 141,
142 (2003).
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safeguard[s] the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and staff
members according to law.”42 The ACFTU’s Constitution supplies that
“[t]he basic duty of the Chinese trade unions is to protect the legitimate
rights and interests of workers.”43 Second, the ACFTU is to “serve as a
bridge and link between the Party and workers and an important social pillar
of the state power . . . .”44 In this second sense, the workers organized by the
ACFTU become instrumental to China’s economic development agenda.45
The general international consensus is that the ACFTU’s twofold mission is
a contradiction;46 the union is primarily an organ of the Communist Party
and only secondarily a representative of workers.47
The MOHRSS 48 is a bureaucratic agency directed by the State
Council. The MOHRSS was formed by the 2008 National People’s
Congress to supersede the functions of the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security and the Ministry of Personnel.49 In the wake of the economic crisis,
the MOHRSS played an important role in navigating the introduction of
recent monumental labor legislation, while still keeping China’s labor
market competitive.50
These subordinate bodies play an important role in enacting and
enforcing labor legislation. Each has impressed its influence on the
development of labor dispatch legislation in China within larger transitions
in the country’s political economy.

42

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa (
)
Trade Union Law
(promulgated by Order No. 57 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 3, 1992, amended
Oct. 27, 2001, effective Apr. 3, 1992), Art. 2 (China), translated in Trade Union Law of the People’s
Republic of China, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/english/DAT/214784.htm [hereinafter Trade
Union Law]
43
ALL-CHINA FED’N OF TRADE UNIONS, General Principles, CONST. OF THE CHINESE TRADE UNIONS
(Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.acftu.org.cn/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=48&aid=469.
44
Id.
45
Id. (The working class, “represents the advanced productive forces and relations of production,
serves as the main force in the reform and opening-up and in socialist modernization drive and is a
powerful and concentrated social force maintaining the social stability”).
46
Han Dongfang, Labor Law Strengthens Chinese Union, ASIA TIMES (Jan. 18, 2008),
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/JA18Cb01.html.
47
Id. (“[I]n the majority of enterprises, ACFTU branch union officials are appointed by or in some
other way beholden to management, they would not dare raise an effective challenge to management on
behalf of the employees”).
48
Also known as Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan ((
).
49
BROWN, supra note 13, at 13.
50
MOHRSS To Take Measures to Help Enterprises and Stabilize Employment, CHINA CSR (Nov. 19,
2008), www.chinacsr.com/en/2008/11/19/3657-mohrss-to-take-measures-to-help-enterprises-and-stabilizeemployment/.
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Move to the Market Economy – “Reform and Opening” Led to
Precarious Labor

The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee,
held in 1978, led to the announcement of the Communist Party’s “Four
Modernizations” policy.51 This policy is described in the “General Program”
of the Party’s Constitution as a shift in the “focus of the work of the whole
Party onto economic development . . . ushering in a new era of development
in the cause of socialism . . . [and] the building of socialism with Chinese
characteristics . . . .”52 China dissolved the guaranteed “iron rice bowl”
social welfare policies, 53 favoring labor contracts and market-based
development.54 In October 1992, during the Fourteenth Party Congress in
Beijing, the arrangement was christened the “socialist market economy.”55
The “socialist market economy” has created multiple hardships for
Chinese workers. Indeed, China’s economic development is predicated on
the uneven application of labor rights 56 as part of a larger neoliberal
institutional arrangement.57 The Deng era initiated rapid development, with
the byproduct of creating splits among rural and urban, migrant and nonmigrant, and unionized and non-unionized workers. 58 The regional
disparities wrought by “the new China” have prompted rural Chinese to seek
work opportunities in cities.59 By and large, this domestic migration means
that workers exchange safe working conditions for work opportunities.60
Issues stemming from the disparate impacts of China’s labor law
regime include: migration, wage theft, unsafe working conditions, a
removed social safety net, and the externalization of the costs of social
51

See IMMANUEL C. Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 803 (6th ed. 1999).
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 7 (2001).
See MAURICE MEISNER, MAO’S CHINA AND AFTER: A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 471
(3d ed. 1999).
54
See generally WILLIAM HURST, THE CHINESE WORKERS AFTER SOCIALISM (2009).
55
Tony Saich, The Fourteenth Party Congress: A Programme for Authoritarian Rule, 132 CHINA Q.
1136, 1142 (1992).
56
See BROWN, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that “economic development has been uneven, causing
regional and urban/rural disparities that, in turn, have brought about an influx of millions of rural workers
into the cities for better work opportunities, though not necessarily better working conditions”).
57
ELI FRIEDMAN, INSURGENCY TRAP: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTSOCIALIST CHINA 15 (2014), available
at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=books.
58
BROWN, supra note 13, at 6.
59
See Yaohui Zhao, Leaving the Countryside: Rural-to-Urban Migration Decisions in China, 89 AM.
ECON. REV. 281, 281 (1999) (“The migration of rural labor to urban areas in China since the mid-1980’s
has created the largest labor flow in world history”).
60
See id.
52
53
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reproduction to the countryside.61 Even in the 1960s, Chinese social welfare
benefited industrial workers who were covered at the expense of peasants
who were not.62 The division of workers was driven by the economics of
development. 63 By focusing economic development on the Eastern
seaboard—cities like Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing—while
simultaneously enforcing the hukou residency permit system, China has
pursued an institutional arrangement that spatially separates economic
growth and social reproduction.64 This arrangement functionally depresses
wages,65 inhibiting worker bargaining power and providing cheap labor to
employers.66 The process is sometimes referred to as “informalization,”67
“work precarity,”68 or “casualization.”69
In China, workers in the informal economy are often members of the
migrant population known as liudong renkou (commonly translated,
“floating population”). The types of employment in the informal economy
range from hired workers without formal contracts to those who are
misclassified as informal employees, as well as to domestic workers,
temporary workers, casual workers, community service workers, hourly
workers without specified wages, and workers in small enterprises without
formalized employment.70 Liudong renkou is a section of the workplace
61
LINDA WONG, MARGINALIZATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN CHINA 3 (2005) (“Since the mid-1980s,
an increasing number of peasant migrants, between 80 to 100 million, have sought work and business
opportunities in urban areas. Nevertheless, they still carry their rural status and do not qualify for urban
welfare”).
62
JOYCE K. KALLGREN, Social Welfare and China’s Industrial Workers, in CHINESE COMMUNIST
POLITICS IN ACTION 540, 542-43 (A. Doak Barnett ed., 1969).
63
Id. at 542.
64
Eli
Friedman,
Outside
the
New
China,
JACOBIN
(Sept.
2013),
http://jacobinmag.com/2013/09/outside-the-new-china/.
65
Anita Chan, A Race to the Bottom, 46 CHINA PERSP. 41, 42 (2003).
66
See Ching Kwan Lee & Eli Friedman, China Since Tiananmen: The Labor Movement, CORNELL U.
(July 15, 2009), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/837 (“[China’s neoliberal regime] has created
an influx of investment, insatiable demand for Chinese products, employment opportunities for Chinese
workers, and room for the Chinese economy to grow by putting the squeeze on labor. But . . . [t]he global
financial and economic crisis is pushing the fundamental problem—the dispossession of workers as direct
producers—to the surface, testing the limits of the Chinese approach to development”).
67
See generally Josh Bivens, Growing "Informalization" of Employment in the Developing World,
ECON. POLICY INST. (July 28, 2004), www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_snapshots_07282004/.
68
See generally Brett Neilson, Precarity as a Political Concept, or, Fordism as Exception, 25
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 51 (2008).
69
See, e.g., Neil M. Coe, Jennifer Johns & Kevin Ward, Agents of Casualization? The Temporary
Staffing Industry and Labour Market Restructuring in Australia, 9 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 55 (2008).
70
See Mary Gallagher, John Giles, Albert Park & Meiyan Wang, China's 2008 Labor Contract Law:
Implementation and Implications for China's Workers 7 (The World Bank Development Research
Group, Working Paper No. 6542, 2014), available at http://library1.nida.ac.th/worldbankf/fulltext/wps0654
2.pdf.
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playing an increasingly large role in Chinese economic production.71 Before
the implementation of the LCL and its Amendments, roughly 12.5% of
peasant workers had labor contracts.72 The remainder were unprotected by
China’s labor laws.73 Informally employed workers supplied 21% of the
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 1991 to 1995, 52%
from 1996 to 2000, and then 54% from 2001 to 2005.74 Overall, between
1990 and 2004, informal employment grew by 12.5% annually.75 By 2005,
over one-third of the overall labor force was informally employed.76 In 2007,
the MOHRSS predicted informal employment would become the default
form of work in the coming decades. The extent of the informalization of
the workforce reached such a level that, prior to the enactment of the LCL,
the country faced a major scandal when large-scale slave labor practices
were discovered.77
Thus, despite tremendous economic growth and social development
since market liberalization in 1978,78 labor standards deteriorated for a large
portion of China’s workforce as they were forced into informal

71

Madison Park & CY Xu, Is Migrant System China’s Apartheid?, CNN (Dec. 25, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/25/world/asia/china-migrant-family/index.html.
72
See Li Jing, China's New Labor Contract Law and Protection of Workers, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1083, 1094 n.38 (2008).
73
See HAINA LU, THE RIGHT TO WORK IN CHINA: CHINESE LABOR LEGISLATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 287 (2011).
74
Ying Zhou, The State of Precarious Work in China, 57 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 354, 368 (2013) (citing
figures from 2006 Zhongguo Feizhenggui Jiuye Fazhan Baogao: Laodongli Shichang de Zai Guancha
(
(
6
) [The 2006 Report on the Development of Informal
Employment in China: A Review of the Labor Market] (Ren Yuan & Peng Xizhe eds., 2007)).
75
Id. at 356 (citing figures from Hu Angang & Zhao Li, Woguo Zhuanxingqi Chengzhen Feizhenggui
Jiuye yu Feizhenggui Jingji (1990-2004) (
(1990-2004)) [Urban
Informal Employment and Informal Economy in the Transitional Period in China (1990-2004)], 21(3) J.
TSINGHUA UNIV. 111, 111-19 (2006)).
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came shortly after officials and state media unearthed the widespread use of slave labor in as many as 8,000
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since China began adopting market-style economic policies a quarter century ago. Police have freed nearly
600 workers, many of them children, held against their will in factories owned or operated by wellconnected businessmen and local officials”).
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http://www.economist.com/node/12758848.
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employment.79 The legislative response to this phenomenon emerged in the
form of the LCL.
It is important to note that China is not unique in how it experiences
the effects of informal labor. The International Labour Organization
(“ILO”) estimates that informal employment comprises the majority of all
non-agricultural work worldwide.80 Informal work, the ILO stresses, is
characterized by poor working conditions, poverty, and susceptibility to
wage theft and other abuses.81 Migrant workers, women, minorities, and
others from precarious social positions are especially vulnerable to the
hazards of informal employment.82
III.

CHINA PROMOTED WORKERS’ RIGHTS THROUGH INDIVIDUALIZED
LABOR CONTRACTS

The LCL was designed to expand on earlier labor laws. In fact, the
LCL was not the first gesture toward providing labor rights through
individualized labor contracts. In 1994, the Labor Law (Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo laodong fa) consolidated all previous labor legislation and
promulgated a unified law of labor relations on a national level.83 The law
guaranteed access to arbitration, litigation, and workers’ compensation.84 It
mandated labor contracts between employers and employees.85 Under the
Labor Law the requirements for labor contracts were similar to what would
later be clarified in the LCL: contracts should specify the timing of the
employment, the content of the job, pay, disciplinary policy, termination
procedures, and the legal consequences for breach.86
However, in the context of market reform and economic restructuring,
workplace protections such as the Labor Law appeared inadequate. 87
79
See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 978; see generally Albert Park & Fang Cai,
The Informalization of the Chinese Labor Market 17-35 (Aug. 2009),
http://ihome.ust.hk/~albertpark/papers/informalization.pdf.
80
Informal Economy, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://ilo.org/global/topics/employmentpromotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 989-90.
84
BROWN, supra note 40, at 25.
85
Laodong Fa (
	
  [Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July
5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995) Art. 16 (China).
86
Id. at art. 19.
87
See Wang, supra note 18, at 438; Lyle Morris, An Uncertain Victory for China’s Workers, YALE
GLOBAL ONLINE (June 24, 2008), yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/uncertain-victory-china’s-workers (“The
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Privatization, layoffs, and unequal treatment under the Labor Law created
the floating worker population.88 Additionally, social safety nets effectively
vanished and workplace protections went unenforced.89
The LCL retained most of the core protections set forth in the Labor
Law, yet it also strengthened the contractual provisions.90 Enacted in June
2007 and entered into force on January 1, 2008,91 its stated purposes were
“clarifying the rights and obligations of both parties of labor contracts” and
“protecting the legitimate rights and interests of employees.”92
In line with the stated purposes, the contents of the LCL can be
divided into four categories. First, the LCL contained new legislation aimed
at protecting workers and securing their benefits.93 Second, the new law
clarified employer obligations. 94 Third, the LCL required notice to
individual workers of their rights and the obligations of their employers.95
Finally, the law proposed better monitoring of labor conditions through
empowering local labor officials.96
The legal protections to workers were numerous. The LCL provided
for for-cause termination provisions in many contracts for full-time, longterm employees. It required severance pay for most workers covered by a
full-time contract, set limits on overtime hours, and required employers to
provide written contracts to all employees beginning January 1, 2008.97 The
LCL also required permanent contracts for workers employed for a specific
period of time, limiting the practice of temporary contracts.98 Additionally,
the law promoted social insurance coverage for workers and ensured
payment of overtime wages. 99 Proponents of the LCL hoped that the
increased portion of the labor force covered by contracts would tend to

[LCL] – brought about after a spate of headline-grabbing incidents of severe worker abuse in China – is to
curb worker abuse”).
88
See BROWN, supra note 40, at 6.
89
Id. at 6-11.
90
Wang, supra note 18, at 434.
91
See LCL, supra note 13.
92
Id. at Art. 1.
93
Id.
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Id.
95
Id. at Art. 8.
96
Id. at Art. 5.
97
Id. at Art. 10.
98
Id. at Art. 15.
99
See Xiaoying Li, How Does China’s New Labor Contract Law Affect Floating Workers? 3 (Nov.
15, 2011) (unpublished article) (on file with Harvard Law School).
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formalize the labor economy, thereby facilitating the enforcement of
already-existing labor protections such as the Labor Law.100
Formalizing the labor economy involved overcoming twin hurdles:
restricting probationary periods for workers101 and curtailing frivolous firing.
Probationary hiring was explicitly challenged by the original summary draft
of the LCL.102 Prior to its enactment, it was estimated that less than 20% of
workers in small- or medium-sized private sector enterprises benefited from
labor contracts.103 Under the LCL, companies would face penalties for
failing to provide contracts to their workers. 104 Additionally, the third
consecutive labor contract between a given employer and employee will
necessarily be an “open term labor contract,” meaning it will contain a forcause provision.105 There was an observable increase in the number of
workers benefiting from labor contracts. From 2007 to 2008 there was a 3%
increase in the mean percentage of workers with open-term contracts.106
Although the majority of workers today remain employed under short-term
contracts,107 the law increased the gross number of workers with individual
labor contracts, along with social insurance and workers’ compensation.108
In addition to covering more workers as a share of the total workforce,
the LCL deepened gains for covered workers.109 Economists Fan Cui, Ying
Ge, and Fengchun Jing found that:
[L]abor law reform significantly encouraged wage and
nonwage benefit growth. The impact of labor law reform is
greater for state-owned firms and collective-owned firms, for

100

See Harper Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, supra note 12, at 975-76.
See LCL, supra note 13, at art. 19-21.
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See RONALD C. BROWN, EAST ASIAN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 481 (2012).
104
LCL, supra note 13, at art. 82 (stating that employers who fail to conclude a written labor contract
with an employee pay workers double wages).
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Id. at art. 14.
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Changhee Lee & Mingwei Liu, Measuring the Effects of the Collective Voice Mechanism and the
Labour Contract Law: A Survey of Labour Relations and Human Resources Management Practices in 600
Enterprises in China, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 37 (2012).
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See Richard B. Freeman & Xiaoying Li, VOX, Has China’s New Labour Contract Law Worked?
(Dec. 22, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/has-china-s-new-labour-contract-law-worked.
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Fan Cui, Ying Ge & Fengchun Jing, The Effects of the Labor Contract Law on the Chinese Labor
Market, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 462 (2013), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.11
11/jels.12016/full (“Implementation of the Labor Contract Law reduced the wage elasticity of labor
demand, especially in highly unionized and skill-intensive industries”).
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large and domestic firms, and for regions with high union
intensity and skill intensity.110
An early result of the LCL was to make layoffs more costly.111 Employees
with seniority became more protected in their jobs because the LCL requires
open-ended contracts for employees who either receive a third temporary
contract or who have been at a firm for more than ten years.112 In the first
year of the LCL, this had the measurable effect of raising the mean
percentage of employees covered by open-ended contracts.113 Additionally,
the percentage of workers with medical coverage, age insurance, injury
insurance (workers’ compensation), and unemployment insurance increased
after the implementation of the LCL.114
A.

The LCL Opened a Loophole While Pursuing Workers’ Rights
Through Individualized Labor Contracts

The informal, non-standard workforce, including dispatch workers
and other temporary workers in China, has grown globally.115 The so-called
“labor dispatch” industry, which is comprised of human resources firms akin
to temporary staffing agencies elsewhere, was one face of a national trend
toward informal or precarious employment.116 While informal employment
generally plagued China’s workforce, the dispatch industry, itself a subset of
informal work, did not pose a regulatory problem until after the
implementation of the LCL.117 This is because the LCL opened a loophole
through which employers could pursue formalized, precarious employment.
The Chinese government has increased regulation of dispatch labor
because the industry circumvented formal labor relationships and
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Id.
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112
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undermined the stated goals of the LCL. Discussion of the dispatch labor
industry first appeared in Chinese political discourse in 2002. 118 Soon
thereafter it attracted policy attention, beginning as early as 2005.119 It then
received regulation in 2008.120 Because dispatch labor circumvented the
formalization of labor relationships, there was an inherent tension between
labor protections based on individual contract and the labor dispatch
industry.
In the twelve years since its emergence, the dispatch agency has come
under increasing regulation to encourage compliance with individualized
labor contracts. In the five years following the regulation of the industry
through the LCL, the government has clarified the contours of the industry
and adopted increasingly detailed regulations. Under the new regulations,
dispatch employment is redefined, and three categories of nonstandard
workers are defined: part-time workers, temporary workers, and dispatch
workers.
B.

Seeing the Other Side of the Financial Crisis

Public comment on the LCL prior to its enactment was voluminous.121
The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, for example, threatened
to lead a divestment movement if the law passed.122 The LCL came into
force in January 2008123 as the global financial crisis known as “the Great
Recession” affected global demand for Chinese exports,124 and was heavily

118
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119
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122
See Aaron Halegua, The Debate Over Raising Chinese Labor Standards Goes International, 1
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criticized when the financial crisis hit China that same year.125 Business
interests vociferously opposed many of the provisions, claiming that the law
would make it difficult to maintain operations in China.126 Some argued the
LCL made it harder for business to survive the economic downturn.127
Others claimed the LCL fueled China’s massive strike wave in 2010.128 The
law allegedly fed illegitimate causes of action to litigious employees129 and
raised the price of labor.130 It even received blame for the failure of a
number of enterprises.131
These criticisms range in validity. On the one hand, in some instances
the law was opportunistically and unfairly criticized. On the other hand, the
law had measurably positive effects for workers,132 which may have raised
employers’ costs. Furthermore, the law likely provided a weapon for
workers in the courts. 133 China’s national labor union, the ACFTU,
expressed its public support for the law.134 However, ambiguity lingers
regarding whether the rising costs of labor in China in 2008 were
attributable to the financial crisis impeding demand for Chinese labor, or the
increased cost of labor protections under the LCL.135 According to one
estimate, the LCL directly contributed a 2-3% increase in labor costs for
foreign enterprises.136 Others credited labor shortages and an attendant weak
labor market for rising wages. Whatever the reason for the rise in wages,
some garment manufacturers, for example, relocated their operations
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elsewhere to avoid the rising cost of labor.137 In November 2008, the
MOHRSS issued a formal request for companies to minimize layoffs.138
Foreign demand for Chinese products declined following the financial
crisis of 2008.139 Provincial governments attempted to keep their labor
affordable and competitive to retain foreign capital.140 For example, in
January 2009, the Guangdong Provincial Procuratorate issued a “Ten-point
Opinion” related to stabilizing the economy.141 The opinion stressed that
law enforcement should exercise caution when investigating white-collar
crime. 142 It instructed law enforcement to protect local enterprises by
focusing prosecutions on workers who may engage in industrial action and
slow production.143 Legal pressure on workers would discourage workrelated grievances, thereby shielding local enterprises that violated labor
laws. The lack of workers’ rights enforcement by localities like Guangdong
and the efforts of employers to evade formalizing employment undermined
the power of the LCL.
Employers responded to the law’s economic effects in three ways.
First, the LCL’s expansion of contract coverage and labor security for
workers incentivized employers to try reducing workforce costs.144 For
example, in anticipation of the LCL some companies, such as the camera
manufacturer Olympus Optical Co., Ltd., laid off Chinese workers and
shifted production to neighboring countries.145 Second, some employers
sought means of “creative compliance”146 with the LCL through the use of
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dispatch labor.147 Third, many employers simply chose to not provide labor
contracts to workers.
Migrant workers were especially susceptible to this third type of
response. One survey of forty municipalities reported that only 12.5% of
migrant workers are covered by contract.148 By 2010 one estimate put the
number of workers in small enterprises with labor contracts in Wuhan,
Hubei at only 5%. 149 Lack of overtime payment was (and remains) a
common concern among workers.150 The equal pay provisions also failed to
reach dispatch workers.151 One survey of temporary workers in Guangzhou
showed they earned one-third of the pay of formal employees.152 Thus,
economic pressures undermined enforcement of the LCL and the aspiration
to provide labor rights by individual contract.
IV.

THE PROVISIONS ON DISPATCH AND PART-TIME WORKERS PROVIDED
AVENUES FOR FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF WORKERS

In an attempt to compromise between the perceived need for labor
flexibility153 and the labor protections of the law, the 2008 LCL outlined a
trilateral contractual relationship between workers, dispatch agencies, and
businesses who act as customers for the dispatch agencies.154 In a dispatch
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labor155 arrangement, a worker signs the labor contract with the dispatch
agency. The dispatch agency, under separate contract with a business
enterprise, then dispatches the worker to the business, which acts as the
“accepting entity.” 156 The workers are therefore not employed by the host
company, but are rather merely “leased” from the dispatch agency.157
Labor contracts between dispatch agencies and workers must be set
for a fixed-term of no fewer than two years.158 To be established under the
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China,159 the dispatch agencies
are “employers” of the workers.160 The agency assumes all liability as
employer under the law and is obligated to provide labor contracts to the
dispatch workers.161
Section 2 of the LCL contains ten provisions relating to worker
dispatch services.162 Article 57 of the pre-Amendments LCL set out a
minimum renminbi (RMB) 500,000 registered capital requirement for all
worker dispatch services. 163 Under Article 58, a contract between the
dispatch service provider and the worker must conform to all of the
requirements of any other labor contract, and must additionally state the
specifics of the dispatch arrangement.164 Article 66 of the Labor Contract
Law provides that dispatch workers shall only be employed in “temporary,”
“auxiliary,” or “substitute” positions.165
Under the LCL, the accepting entity, while not formally the employer,
has several obligations to the dispatch worker. First, the accepting entity
must comply with state labor standards, including safe working
conditions.166 Additionally, part-time workers are subject to wage and hour
regulations such as local minimum wage laws.167 The accepting entity must
pay overtime, performance bonuses, and benefits relevant to the position,168
155

See LCL, supra note 13, at art. 53.
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train dispatch workers, 169 and adjust wages for long-term dispatch
workers.170 Accepting entities, additionally, are prohibited from establishing
their own dispatch agencies171 or sub-dispatching workers to other business
enterprises. 172 These provisions were intended to clarify the role of
accepting entities and to minimize the differences between dispatch workers
and other employees performing the same function in a workplace.173
Part-time employees are the other side of the nonstandard workforce
that grew after the implementation of the LCL. In the original language of
the LCL, since amended, part-time workers were defined narrowly: parttime workers were those paid on an hourly-wage basis and could not work
more than four hours per day or more than twenty-four hours per week.174
Employers were not required to provide labor contracts to part-time
employees.175 Without labor contracts, part-time employees are not granted
several benefits otherwise granted to employees. For example, while
employers were required to pay severance to full-time employees, they were
not required to do the same for part-time employees.176
A.

The LCL Itself Supplied the Formal Means through Which Employers
Could Evade the Intent of the Law.

Even though the original LCL limited the use of dispatch workers, the
provisions of the law were ineffective. Indeed, the use of dispatch labor
expanded rapidly from the years 2008 to 2013. In 2010, the ACFTU
produced a survey suggesting there were up to sixty million dispatch
workers in China.177 More recently, according to the China Labor Dispatch
Industry Indepth Research and Investment Strategy Report, 2013-2017, there
are roughly 26,000 labor dispatch companies in China, employing
approximately twenty-seven million people. Dispatch workers make up
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roughly 5% of the total workforce. 178 Some industries have a larger
representation of dispatch workers than others.179 For example, 20% of
Bank of China workers were dispatched.180 Some sectors of government-run
enterprises employ a workforce comprised predominantly of dispatch
workers.181
There is a permissible role for labor dispatch, but labor leasing is
often used by employers as a semi-legal shortcut to reduce labor costs.182
One way to do this is to use dispatch labor as a method of probationary
hiring. In this method, the temporary dispatch is a trial for future full-time
employees. Employers evaluate dispatch worker productivity and screen for
the best employees. This process eliminates selection and error risk and
effectively reduces personnel costs. Reports from Chinese labor dispatch
providers confirm this:
“If a worker doesn’t obey orders, then they can just get rid of
them,” says Zhang Zhiru, director of the Shenzhen Chunfeng
Labor Dispute Service. And although required to by law, labor
dispatchers often do not provide social welfare insurance,
which can make up as much as 40 percent of a full-fledged
employee’s cost . . . .183
The practice of employing temporary dispatch workers as a business practice
designed to lower labor costs is so widespread, it is used by foreign

178

China Labor Dispatch Industry Indepth Research and Investment Strategy Report, 2013-2017,
QIANZHAN (May 6, 2014), http://en.qianzhan.com/report/detail/6cdf8ac1017640a3.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2014).
179
Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, CHINA LABOR NEWS
TRANSLATIONS (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.clntranslations.org/file_download/140 (listing industries with
larger representation of dispatch workers: “petroleum, chemical, telecommunications, finance, banking,
aviation, and railways”).
180
Jiang Jie, Equal Work Rights For Temps, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/802695.shtml.
181
See Rights of 60 Million Labor Dispatch Workers Hard to Protect, supra note 179, at 1.
182
See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, NEW LABOR CONTRACT LAW AFFECTS EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS OF FOREIGN INVESTED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA (June 25, 2013),
http://www.dorsey.com/eu_China_Labor_Contract_Law_062413/ (“[B]enefits of labor dispatching
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multinational companies operating in China, including Swire Beverages
Limited.184
Attrition dispatch, also known as “reverse dispatch” is the practice of
transferring full-time contract employees to a dispatch service to reduce the
number of fixed staff and enhance flexibility.185 Attrition dispatch brings
administrative simplicity to firms: it “freed them from having to navigate the
paperwork required by labour and tax authorities.” 186 The practice also
saves money for firms through lower wages and social security payments.187
Notwithstanding LCL Article 63, which provides that “workers dispatched
shall have the right to receive the same pay as that received by employees of
the accepting entity for the same work,”188 workers whose contracts are with
a dispatch agency “are paid a much lower salary and enjoy fewer benefits
than formal coworkers.”189 A story from China Labor Watch’s investigation
into multinational electronics manufacturers illustrates the practice:
At Tyco Electronics and Catcher Technology for example,
although the factories directly employ some workers, they sign
labor contracts with a separate labor dispatch agency. As a
result of this inconsistency, the factories may arbitrarily fire
workers, providing workers with almost no job security.190
The arrangement weakens worker bargaining power so much that workers
pay a fee to the dispatch company in order to work.191 Although prohibited
by Article 60 of the LCL, 192 the practice continues and is sometimes
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administered discriminatorily. A description from China Labor Watch
describes this violation in practice:
Within 100 meters from the back gate of the Tyco factory, there
is a labor dispatch company, Huacai, which conducts
recruitment for Tyco. Tyco and Huacai have signed a longstanding agreement, through which Huacai recruits workers on
behalf of Tyco. Workers recruited via the labor dispatch
company sign a contract with Huacai only [not the factory].
Wages are also distributed to workers by Huacai who use it as
an intermediary. The Huacai employees stressed they only
recruited women and do not recruit male workers. At the back
gate of the factory, on the surrounding streets, there is a largescale labor market with many different companies that all
recruit for Tyco. Female workers seeking recruitment must pay
$15 USD fee and male workers must pay a $30 USD fee.193
Such practices exceed the permissible scope of labor dispatch under the
LCL, but nevertheless remain common.194 The LCL provided incentives
that led to this arrangement. It allowed reverse dispatch, the expanded use
of labor dispatch to avoid the rising costs of employing full-time workers
and thereby it tacitly permitted industry to prey upon precarious workers.
Ultimately, the LCL birthed a dispatch labor industry that undermined the
remedial intent of the law.195
B.

China Amended and Clarified the Labor Contract Law to Address
Excessive Use of Informal Labor

In its earliest stages following the LCL, “labor dispatch” practices
were limited. The Regulation on the Implementation of the Labor Contract
Law of the People's Republic of China (“Implementing Regulations”)
applied the obligations of other employers to dispatch agencies.196 The
193
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implementing regulations require employers to comply with all relevant state
and national labor laws when employing temporary workers.197 Employers
must also provide severance pay to temporary workers.198
However, under the early version of the LCL, there was no legal
deterrent against using part-time temporary workers to replace full-time
workers.199 In fact, many companies found it economically profitable to
shift work from full-time employees, who were required to be provided with
a labor contract, to part-time employees, who were comparatively
cheaper.200
Recognizing that the expansion of labor dispatch thwarts the purpose
of the LCL201 and undermines economic stability by causing labor unrest,202
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress amended the
Law in 2013 to curb the abuse of dispatch labor.203 The Eleventh National
Congress voted to amend on December 28, 2012. 204 The resulting
Amendments were announced by January 2013 and came into effect on July
1, 2013.205 The Amendments addressed the largely under regulated dispatch
worker industry and set narrow limits on dispatch employment.206
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The ACFTU, for its part, advocated closing the contractual
workaround of the LCL.207 The loophole, which had not gone unnoticed by
employers or legal analysts,208 “allowed workers to sign labour contracts
with intermediary employment agencies rather than directly with their
ultimate employers.” 209 The Amendments did not fix the loophole
altogether, though they established standards for this practice.210
The Amendments define the positions listed in LCL Art. 66.
Temporary positions are defined to be six months or less.211 Auxiliary
positions support and service the principal business activity but are not core
positions.212 Dispatch workers may be employed in substitute positions
when full-time employees are on leave or otherwise unavailable.213 The
enterprise is required to replace full-time workers with other full-time
workers when possible. 214 The rule now clarifies that contractual (i.e.
bilateral) employment is the default form of employment in China; dispatch
labor may only be used to supplement, not replace, a firm’s full-time
workforce.
Dispatch agencies also now operate under tighter regulation. The
Amendments provide a minimum size for dispatch agencies.215 All dispatch
agencies are required to have operating capital expenses over two million
yuan; the earlier requirement was only RMB 500,000.216 This provision
should help to clarify the difference between dispatch centers and labor
trafficking networks.217 For example, firms now must be registered with an
administrative labor bureau, and small or solo dispatch agencies will not be
permitted. 218 The Amendments require that all written contracts also

207
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identify the proper rate of pay for workers and verify that the worker’s
payment complies with the contracts.219
One goal of the Amendments was to remove the cost-saving use of
dispatch labor to evade the LCL.220 The Amendments make clear that
dispatch employees are required to be paid the same amount as full-time
employees doing the same work.221 This equal pay provision requires that
workers performing the same job shall be provided not only with equal
pay—as under Article 63 of the original LCL222—but with equal overall
compensation, including social security payments, wages, workers’
compensation, and other benefits.223
The amended law also narrows the scope of dispatch labor. The
Amendments contain new rules on the duration of temporary contracts.
Under the new law, no temporary position can last more than six months.224
The purpose of this amendment was to prevent the formation of a subset of
the workforce perpetually trapped in temporary positions.
The Amendments restrict the types of jobs that may be substituted to
“auxiliary positions” and “substitute positions.”225 Auxiliary positions are
supportive of the primary functions of the business.226 Substitute positions
may have a stronger nexus to the main operations of the enterprise, but
dispatch workers are only available for such positions to cover full-time
employees on leave.227
Further, the Amendments specified dispatch workers must not exceed
a specified percentage of a firm’s workforce, which is determined by a labor
arm of the State Council.228 Because the amendment was unclear, this led to

219
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speculation that there would either be no national percentage, or if there
were, it would be around 30-40%.229
The Amendments prescribed tougher penalties for violations.230 The
fine for violations range from RMB 5,000 to RMB 10,000 per employee.231
Article 92 of the pre-Amendments LCL provided for fines only ranging from
RMB 1,000 to RMB 5,000.232 Under Article 92 of the Amendments, fines
for violation of the LCL came to include revocation of a dispatch agency’s
business license, joint and several liability between dispatch agency and
accepting entity, and confiscation of illegal gains.233
The Amendments did not resolve the practice of companies providing
limited dispatch services with their own workforce and subcontracting out
workers to other companies. 234 In this way, a company could reduce
workforce demands and minimize severance compensation by arranging for
its contract workers to work at other companies while retaining its
manpower.
C.

Remaining Problems with Enforcement and Misuse of Dispatch Labor

Even with heftier legal penalties in place, many provisions of the LCL
still lacked enforcement. For example, the equal pay provision, which had
been in legal effect since the Labor Law, did not effectively equalize
dispatch employees.235 Abusive dispatch labor and residual ambiguity posed
social and regulatory problems.
In an effort to clarify some of the ambiguities left by the amendment,
the MOHRSS issued draft provisions for public comment on August 7, 2013,
one month after the Amendments came into effect.236 The agency accepted
comments on the Draft Provisions until September 2013.237
229
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Reactions to the Draft Provisions from business were hostile, as they
were for the LCL and its Amendments. Specifically, the Draft Provisions
upset some employers by proposing a national cap of 10% dispatch workers
in a given firm. 238 Nevertheless, following the initial period of public
comment, a version of the Draft Provisions took effect on March 1, 2014.239
The Interim Provisions provided specificity where the Amendments
had been silent. For example, the Amendments had contained some residual
ambiguity relating to the definition of “auxiliary position” and other
terms.240 Auxiliary positions under the Interim Provisions are now defined
on a firm-by-firm basis, but only after negotiation with either a labor union
or employee representative.241 Also, whereas the permissible positions for
dispatch laborers in an enterprise had been narrowed to temporary, auxiliary,
and substitute work, the Interim Provisions specified that such positions may
only be filled after the employees consult an “employees’ congress” and
negotiate with the labor union or employees' representatives. 242 Some
scholars welcome the newest wave of reform, yet predict it will take many
years for employers to adjust to the new legal regime. 243 The Interim
Provisions demand a more ambitious rate of compliance; all firms are
granted two years to reduce the total number of dispatch employs under the
law’s threshold.244
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zxhd/SYzhengqiuyijian/201308/t20130807_109508.htm
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THE RIGHT TO STRIKE COULD REPLACE THE REMEDIAL INTENT OF THE
LABOR CONTRACT LAW

This comment suggests that it is doubtful that the Interim Provisions
(which mark the most recent iteration in a long line of attempts to legislate
workers’ rights through individual contracts) can fully achieve their
objective.
First, although the Labor Contract Law and its more recent
Amendments and Interim Provisions create strong legal protections for
workers’ rights, a problem with enforcement remains. The 10% cap on
dispatch workers will likely be ignored by many enterprises. A manager
from a dispatch agency in Shanghai recently admitted that:
On average, more than half of the workers at the enterprises we
work with are dispatched by us – in some cases the figure is 90
percent . . . if we followed the rule that the percentage should be
limited to 10 per cent, as some authorities are saying, my
company would shut down within one or two years.245
Secondly, precarious work and informalization of the economy are, by now,
dominant trends that are predicted to continue. 246 Because informally
employed workers do not benefit from workplace protections premised on
individual labor contracts, labor standards for these workers will continue to
deteriorate despite legislative fixes to the labor contract theory of workers’
rights. A decade ago, before the LCL, Professor Wang Yi cautioned against
China’s more general transition from “status” to “contract”:
[I]n the discourse of a contractual world each and every
relationship is rootless, starting anew, from zero. Therefore, to
recover a sense of social justice in China today, it is necessary
to put aside modern notions of . . . the wage contract, and go

245
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back to the origins of a collective world, when our people were
ready to create a utopian society together.247
Through the foregoing analysis of employment law reform and worker
insurgency, it seems Professor Yi correctly foresaw the shortcomings of
contract-based rights. Since China’s economic reform period, “[t]he
commodification of labour has been the constitutive process of China’s turn
to capitalism.”248 Legislative attempts to provide rights notwithstanding, it
appears unlikely China’s economic growth could be used to improve
workers’ livelihood.
Under China’s labor law regime, workers’ rights are defined narrowly
as the right to contract as individuals. Labor laws defined this way are not so
much labor protections as they are a method for reducing economic
stoppages due to industrial action and an inoculation against collective rights.
The LCL, in this sense, is a bargain struck to appease disgruntled workers
while still maintaining a flexible labor market.249 The LCL’s protections
were designed to curb the abuses of the system, while simultaneously
fostering capitalist development.
Third, a more robust system of protecting workers’ rights would be to
eliminate the barriers to collective organizing in China. However, that is a
path China has not opened. As one of ten governments characterized by the
ILO as being “of chief economic importance,” China holds an important seat
on the organization’s Governing Body. 250 Nevertheless, China has not
ratified four of the ILO’s eight fundamental conventions, including the two
conventions explicitly concerned with the right to organize: Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.
87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
(No. 98).251 Article 2 of the ILO Convention 87 proclaims:
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall
have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the
247
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organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own
choosing without previous authorisation.252
Convention 98 reiterates and clarifies the right to organize. Article
8(1)(a) of the UN’s International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) protects:
The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade
union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization
concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic
and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the
exercise of this right other than those necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public order or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.253
In addition to the right to form and join trade unions, paragraphs two
through three of the CESCR also protects “the right of trade unions to
establish national federations,” “the right of trade unions to function freely,”
and “the right to strike.”254 The ILO declares “freedom of association and
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining” as a
“fundamental principle” that its members are obliged “to respect, to promote,
and to realize. . . .”255
According to a survey of quantitative studies of Chinese unions, union
membership and the associated increase in democratic voices in a workplace
has had multiple beneficial effects for workers and the economy as a
whole.256 For example, workplaces with unions are likely to have lower
intra-firm wage inequalities than non-unionized workplaces. 257 Union
presence in a workplace correlates positively with employer compliance
252
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with mandatory social insurance contributions.258 As the survey authors
conclude, “workplace industrial relations institutions offer a channel for the
collective voice of workers at the workplace – to a certain extent.”259
China’s labor union, the ACFTU, has proven inadequate in providing
this right and is seriously flawed as a representative of workers.260 Granted,
there are signs the ACFTU meets its obligation to improve working
conditions. For example, the ACFTU’s intervention into the dispatch labor
debate and its response to the health effects of overwork.261 Even so, the
ACFTU is restrained by a lack of fundamental labor rights such as the right
to organize, defined as the right held by each and every individual to form
and join unions with colleagues, and to participate in collective
bargaining.262
Fourth, if the abuse of dispatch labor continues, workers left without
formal remedies will resort to industrial action rather than legal means to
achieve improved working conditions. According to estimates by China
Labor Bulletin, a Hong Kong-based NGO, the amount of strikes in China
from July to August 2013 were double those observed for the same period
the previous year.263 China Labor Bulletin maintains a detailed strike map,
which illustrates the numerical prevalence of strikes in the Pearl River
Delta.264
Individual legal remedies are difficult to achieve for practical reasons.
Civil suits depend on lawyers in private practice who are willing to take
risks. Still, some lawyers in China are pioneering a “law case intervention
programme,” where lawyers work pro bono to take on an individual
worker’s legal case. 265 Han Dongfang, a labor activist imprisoned for
advocating the formation of an autonomous union during the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests, is one of the most vocal advocates for this
method. Because Chinese civil law provides that workers may file suit for
258
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backpay, he supports lawsuits over pursuing official channels like arbitration
and filing union grievances.266
There are others like Han. Zhou Litai, who gained fame and notoriety
for representing the indigent migrant labor force, claims to have filed over
12,000 cases on behalf of workers.267 For years Zhou took on the cases
under a contingency fee agreement, receiving nothing for cases that he
lost.268 Zhou even provided free room and board to hundreds of injured
workers whom he represented.269 The model is reminiscent of early labor
hall tactics among American unions.
Legal casework of this sort is no guarantee of a remedy, however, and
organizing clandestinely is even riskier. Despite the official discouragement
of independent labor unions, and the criminalization of autonomous worker
actions, unauthorized wildcat strikes (i.e., strikes not authorized by the
union) have proliferated in China. In June 2010, for example, Honda factory
workers in Foshan, Guandong Province, led several extended walkouts to
demand an end to unsafe working conditions, wage arrears, and lack of
collective bargaining power.270 Then, in December of 2011, an estimated
8,000 employees of Korea-based electronics manufacturer LG, striked in
Nanjing, Jiangsu province to protest low wages.271
The Supreme People’s Court, noting the surge in labor unrest
following the passage of the Labor Contract Law, suggested that the fault lay
with employers.272 According to Sun Jungong, “[s]ome enterprises tend to
ignore the protection of workers’ rights in order to maximize profits and
minimize labor costs, with illegal unemployment and violations of
employees’ legitimate rights being common.” 273 The agitation among
workers may be tied to the LCL in more than one way. First, the Labor
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Contract Law may have been successful in raising workers’ awareness of
their legal rights. Second, the laws may have created more protections with
which employers are not prepared to comply. In conjunction with this, the
lack of enforcement built into the laws has left workers with legal wrongs
without formal remedies.274
VI.

CONCLUSION

According to Ke Chen, the emphasis of labor contract reform as the
basis for promoting labor standards in China is rooted in a balancing act
between providing a flexible labor market that preserves employers’ right to
meet their personnel needs, and safeguarding the employees’ right to work
and rights at work.275 It is a mediated policy, seeking the benefits of the
former system where the state was responsible for workers’ livelihoods, and
the benefits of a dynamic economy that can take advantage of a fluid labor
market.
Through several iterations of amendment, clarification, and
refinement through multiple levels of government, China sought to close the
loopholes opened by the attempt to provide workers’ rights through
individual contract.
Meanwhile, the reforms made no meaningful
contribution toward collective rights. Considering the statistical expansion
of informal work, the regulatory problems posed by the labor dispatch
industry, the lack of enforcement of existing remedial legislation, and the
lack of collective rights, it remains unclear whether China can have it both
ways through its balancing act between socialism and capitalism.
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